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Abstract: 
This paper reviews the rationale for quantitative easing when central bank policy rates reach 
near zero levels in light of recent announcements regarding direct asset purchases by the 
Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central 
Bank. Empirical evidence from the previous period of quantitative easing in Japan between 
2001 and 2006 is presented. During this earlier period the Bank of Japan was able to expand 
the monetary base very quickly and significantly. Quantitative easing translated into a greater 
and more lasting expansion of M1 relative to nominal GDP. Deflation subsided by 2005. As 
soon as inflation appeared to stabilize near a rate of zero, the Bank of Japan rapidly reduced 
the monetary base as a share of nominal income as it had announced in 2001. The Bank 
was able to exit from extensive quantitative easing within less than a year. Some implications 
for the current situation in Europe and the United States are discussed.  
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 Following the dramatic worsening of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008, 
many central banks in leading industrial economies quickly moved to slash the policy rate on 
overnight repurchasing agreements and ease credit for liquidity-hungry banks. As policy rates 
reached near zero levels, central banks proceeded to provide further monetary 
accommodation. On March 5, 2009, for example, the Bank of England reduced its policy rate 
to ½ percent and announced that it would “undertake a programme of asset purchases of £75 
billion financed by the issuance of central bank reserves.” Shortly thereafter, on March 18, 
the Federal Reserve anticipated publicly that economic conditions would require keeping the 
policy rate at 0 to ¼ percent for an extended period of time and announced additional 
measures to increase its balance sheet. In particular, the FOMC announced that it would 
“purchase an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total 
purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and increase its purchases of 
agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion.  Moreover, to help 
improve conditions in private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 
billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months.”  
The Bank of England referred to its policy as “quantitative easing” noting that it 
simply shifted the instrument of monetary policy from the policy rate, which  is the price of 
money, to the quantity of money provided. It also clarified that its policy objective remained 
unchanged and it considered influencing the quantity of money directly as  a different means 
of reaching the same end. The Federal Reserve continued to use the term “credit easing” to 
describe its collection of measures and emphasized the effects that the composition of its 
balance sheet would have on credit availability.  Even so, it extensively used direct asset 
purchases to support the magnitude of its balance sheet.   
The European Central Bank stayed on the sidelines for a bit longer, but eventually 
announced direct purchases of covered bonds on May 7, 2009. However, the extent of direct 
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relied more heavily on the effect of an expansion of its repo operations to a 1-year horizon.  
For long-time observers of the Japanese economy such central bank announcements 
are very familiar.  Japanese money market rates fell below 1 percent in 1995 and declined 
towards zero by 1999.  As the economy continued to experience severe recessionary and 
deflationary pressures the Bank of Japan ventured into new territory.  On March 19, 2001, it 
announced „New Procedures for Money Market Operations and Monetary Easing”.  These 
procedures included a number of measures targeted at the price of money, the quantity of 
money provided and the composition of assets purchased by the central bank. The main 
operating target for money market operations was changed from the current uncollateralized 
overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank of Japan. 
The Bank informed the public that it anticipated the policy rate to stay close to zero for an 
extended period. Furthermore, it announced that it would  increase its balance sheet and 
purchase assets directly, including outright purchases of government bonds. Importantly, the 
Bank of Japan made clear that “the new procedures for money market operations continue to 
be in place until the consumer price index (excl. perishables, on a nationwide statistics) 
registers stably at zero percent or an increase year on year. “ 
 
I.  The Rationale for Quantitative Easing  
The implications of near zero nominal interest rates for monetary policy effectiveness, 
the  dangers of deflation and the resulting rationale for quantitative easing were laid out and 
analyzed in Orphanides and Wieland (1998, 2000) and Coenen and Wieland (2003, 2004). As 
long as savers have the option to choose cash – a zero-interest-bearing asset – as a store of 
value, a rate of zero percent constitutes an important speed limit for monetary policy.   In 
severe recessions that are accompanied by low inflation or deflation a central bank would like 
to engineer a reduction of the real interest rate in order to boost aggregate demand. However,  
  3it may not be able to accomplish this objective, because it cannot lower the nominal interest 
rate below zero.  Orphanides and Wieland (1998) evaluated the impact of the zero bound in an 
empirically estimated, dynamic and stochastic macroeconomic model.
1 This model 
incorporates forward-looking behaviour by consumers and price setters but also allows for the 
existence of price rigidities and inflation stickiness. Orphanides and Wieland (1998) then 
showed that the zero bound represents a quantitatively important constraint on monetary 
policy in an environment of near zero steady-state inflation.  Recessions and deflationary 
episodes would be significantly deeper than in the absence of such a floor on nominal interest 
rates. 
Orphanides and Wieland (2000)  study the optimal design of monetary policy in 
periods of near zero interest rates using a simple stylized macroeconomic model. Their paper  
outlines a decision framework for quantitative monetary policy.  Prescriptions for interest rate 
policy are translated into prescriptions for base money.  Of course, in normal times, when the 
interest rate prescriptions are positive, central banks prefer to use an interest rate rather than a 
monetary quantity as operating target.  Interest rates are much easier to observe and control on 
a continuous basis than monetary quantities.  However, in unusual times, when nominal rates 
are stuck at zero, the quantity of base money remains available as a tool for gauging the extent 
of monetary easing.  Thus, Orphanides and Wieland propose that monetary policy operations 
be shifted to the quantity of money provided whenever overnight policy rates register near 
zero.  They also illustrate the usefulness of a measure such as the Marshallian k that puts the 
quantity of nominal money into perspective relative to  nominal income.  
Orphanides and Wieland (2000) also note that interest rates for longer durations or the 
exchange rate could replace the overnight rate as a gauge of monetary operations.  Quantity 
measures, however, remain of interest as they  serve to highlight channels of monetary policy 
transmission that remain available when the interest rate channel is rendered inactive at the 
                                                 
1 The model was re-estimated and a revised, shortened version of the paper published as Coenen, Orphanides and 
Wieland (2004).  
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balances in the economy as well as the relative magnitudes vis-à-vis other assets and 
currencies by providing more base money.  Thereby, , it can still exert an influence on 
aggregate demand and inflation by exploiting real balance and portfolio balance effects. These 
effects work through overall wealth and the relative supplies of various assets or currencies.  
To illustrate the procedure of shifting the central bank’s operating target from a policy 
rate to a monetary quantity, consider a central bank that pursues a systematic interest rate 
policy similar to Taylor’s rule:  
** () ( tt t y t ir
* ) t yy π πα ππ α =++ − − −      (1) 
Here, it stands for the policy rate in period t, πt and π
* refer to the current rate of 
inflation and the inflation target, respectively, while yt and y
* denote current and potential 
output.  r* represents the long-run equilibrium real interest rate.  Thus, the central bank raises 
or lowers the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of inflation from its target and 
output from potential. The extent of the policy response is governed by the coefficients απ and  
αy. Taylor (1993) chooses values of o 0.5 and sets the equilibrium real rate and inflation target 
both to 2 per cent.  
To achieve the operating target for the policy rate defined by equation (1), the central 
bank conducts open market operations.  These operations also  influence the quantity of base 
money. Thus, in principle the interest rate equation could be related to a policy prescription 
for the quantity of base money, or a measure such as the Marshallian k.  The relationship of 
this ratio to the inflation and output gaps may then be described as follows:  
** base money
() (
nominal income
tt y t kk yy π κπ π κ ==+ − − −
* ) t     (2) 
Here, κπ and κy constitute parameters governing the responsiveness of the Marshallian 
k that are consistent with the response coefficients in the interest rate rule. Of course, in 
normal times, equation (1) provides a much better guide for policy, because the quantity of 
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the interest rate is stuck at zero, however, equation (2) can still provide guidance for policy.   
Orphanides and Wieland show that the optimal policy response is nonlinear, because 
the effectiveness of policy is reduced with near zero interest rates. Thus, optimal values of κπ 
and κy are much bigger in a situation when the interest rate is near zero than in normal 
circumstances.  The optimal policy expressed in base money exhibits a kink at the point when 
the interest  rate reaches zero. It provides a motivation for more aggressive expansion of the 
central bank balance sheet in such circumstances.  Orphanides and Wieland also identify a 
second source of nonlinearity, namely the uncertainty about the magnitude of real-balance and 
portfolio-balance effects. If these remaining channels for monetary policy transmission are 
estimated with less precision than the usual interest rate channel, then it would be preferable 
for the central bank to use up the room for interest rate easing pre-emptively, whenever it 
expects to enter a period of deflation.
2
 Coenen and Wieland (2003) estimate a dynamic, stochastic, three-country model of 
the United States, the Eurozone and Japan in order to assess the impact of the zero bound 
under alternative policies such as those proposed by Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
 3 They 
investigate a scenario in which the Japanese economy is hit by a severe recession and 
deflation and compare Taylor’s rule (i.e. equation (1) with Taylor’s original coefficients) to a 
rule that shifts to the quantity of base money at the zero interest floor such as equation (2). 
 Figure 1 compares the output gap and inflation in simulations with the zero bound 
(thick solid line) and in the absence of this constraint (thin solid line).  The recession cum 
deflation episode is caused by an unfortunate sequence of negative demand and cost-push 
shocks. However, the inability of the central bank to lower nominal interest rates below zero 
renders the outcome considerably worse than it would have been without such a constraint.  
                                                 
2 Bernanke (2002) referred to this rationale for pre-emptive interest rate easing. 
3 Coenen and Wieland (2004) further study the relative benefits of exchange rate policy as suggested by 
Svensson (2001) and McCallum (2002) and price-level targeting as proposed by Eggertson and Woodford 
(2003) to avoid a deflationary trap and ameliorate the negative effects of the zero bound.   
  6With the nominal rate bounded at zero, deflationary shocks increase the real interest rate and 
exchange rate and thereby worsen the recession and deflation. This mechanism is potentially 
self-reinforcing and suggests the possibility of a deflationary spiral and collapse of the 
economy.  In the simulation, however, keeping the nominal interest rate at zero for 10 years is 
sufficient to return the economy to steady state eventually.  This recovery may be accelerated 
substantially by a monetary policy that expands the central bank balance sheet aggressively. 
 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 2, a policy rule such as equation (2) with a strengthened response 
of base money in a period with zero interest rates improves outcomes and ameliorates the 
effect of the zero bound (thin solid line).  The mechanism of recovery is apparent from the 
impact of base money creation on inflation expectations and real interest rates. Turning to 
Figure 3 it can be seen that in the absence of a quantitative policy response the real interest 
rate rises during the deflation (thick solid line).  The expansion in base money reduces 
  7deflationary expectations via real-balance, portfolio-balance and expectations channels. 
Consequently, real interest rates remain more moderate (thin solid line). Inflation and positive 
nominal interest rates return more quickly.  
The policy rule with base money ensures that self-fulfilling deflationary spirals do not 
emerge.  A deflation scare would be met with an expansion of base money.  The expansion of 
nominal money balances in conjunction with any expectations-induced drop in the price level 
would imply a rapid increase in real balances, which in turn would stabilize the economy and 
render the expectation of a deflationary spiral untenable.  
  8 
 
II.  The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Money Growth and Inflation in Japan  
Having established the circumstances under which quantitative easing can reduce the 
depth of an economic downturn in the presence of low interest rates and the use of such a 
policy by the Bank of Japan in 2001, it is of interest to investigate the Japanese experience. 
The following three questions are of immediate importance.  Did the Bank of Japan increase 
base money sufficiently so that it implied an expansion relative to nominal income, that is an 
expansion in the Marshallian k?  Did it succeed in creating an overall greater supply of money 
as measured, for example, by M1, and was the quantitative monetary expansion ultimately 
followed by a return of inflation?  
 Figure  4  shows the relationship between the overnight money market rate (vertical 
axis) and the ratio of base money and nominal income (horizontal axis) in Japan from 1981 to 
2008.  The observations shown are annual averages.  In the years prior to 1997 the Bank of 
  9Japan’s policy is easily understood from the movements in the money market interest rate.  In 
this period, the ratio of the monetary base to nominal income typically varied inversely with 
the money market rate as suggested by standard money demand theory.  
 
From 1998 onwards the money market rate remained constant near zero and 
uninformative with regard to the operations of the Bank of Japan. However, the impact of 
monetary policy measures is seen clearly from the Marshallian k. The Bank of Japan steadily 
expanded the monetary base relative to nominal income from 1998 to 2001. This expansion 
intensified dramatically with the announcement of the policy of “quantitative easing”. By 
2002 base money jumped to 18 percent of nominal income and averaged 20 percent by 2005. 
The arrow pointing to the right in Figure 4 indicates the extent of base money creation over 
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resounding yes.  Interestingly, the Bank of Japan was also able to exit from the period of 
quantitative monetary accommodation quite rapidly in 2006.  As indicated by the lower arrow 
pointing to the left the Marshallian k was reduced to around 17 percent by 2007 and averaged 
near that level in 2008. 
 
  Figure 5 compares the time path of base money (thick solid line) and M1 (thin solid 
line) relative to nominal income. As base money grew, so did M1.  In fact, between 2001 and 
2005 it increased by more than 30 percent of nominal income. Thus, the expansion of base 
money engineered by the central bank induced additional deposit creation by banks and led to 
an even greater expansion in the broader monetary aggregate. This expansion came to a halt 
in 2006. However, the ratio of M1 to nominal income did not decline when the Bank of Japan 
reduced the monetary base in 2006 and 2007.   
  11  What about inflation?  Figure 6 shows the time path of the ratio of base money to 
nominal income (thick solid line) together with consumer price inflation (thin solid line). 
Clearly, between 1999 and 2000 the rate of change in the price level had moved into negative 
territory.  With its announcement in March 2001, the Bank of Japan attempted to influence 
longer run inflation expectations by stating that it would stick with its new measures until 
consumer price inflation would register stably at zero percent or an increase year on year.  In 
2001 the cosumer price index continued to fall at a slowly increasing rate.  By February 2002 
it was at -1.6 percent. However, as the central bank continued to expand base money 
dramatically throughout 2002, the rate of price change moved back towards zero. By 2006 it 
appeared to have stabilized around zero percent or a slightly positive rate.  Thus, in 2006 the 
Bank of Japan removed the quantitative monetary stimulus as announced and it did so rather 
quickly. Clearly, Japan did not experience the self-reinforcing process of accelerating 
deflation and deepening recession that is typically associated with a liquidity trap.  The return 
  12of price stability coincided with the sustained shift of the Bank of Japan to quantitative 
monetary policy and direct asset purchases. 
 Of course, establishing evidence of causality between quantitative easing and 
inflation would require further detailed empirical analysis.  However, the following 
observations appear in order. The Bank of Japan’s vigorous quantitative easing did not 
stimulate a dangerous surge of inflation beyond the announced objective of zero percent.  
Thus, exiting from a period of quantitative easing in time and preventing significant 
overshooting of inflation is possible.  In light of the recent re-emergence of deflation in the 
course of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, however, one might have wished that the 
Bank of Japan would have allowed a greater increase in inflation and nominal interest rates so 
as to establish some buffer space for future deflationary shocks.  In fact, already in 1997-98 
commentators had proposed a positive inflation target for Japan. A much-cited example is 
Krugman (1998). Orphanides and Wieland (1998) suggested that a 2 percent inflation target 
would provide an appropriate buffer together with an equilibrium real interest rate of 1 to 2 
percent.  
 
III.  Some Remarks on the Policy Measures of the ECB and the Fed in Spring 2009 
 
  In the first half of 2009, many central banks around the world took steps to influence 
the quantity of money that were similar to those undertaken by the Bank of Japan in 2001.  
Focusing on two of these central banks, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank I 
will remark on some aspects of their decision making.  
First, it is of interest to check what a standard benchmark such as Taylor’s rule would 
prescribe with regard to the setting of the policy rate in the first quarter of 2009. This means 
using equation (1) with the original coefficients of ½ on the inflation and output gaps and 
values of the equilibrium real interest rate and the inflation target equal to 2 percent.  While 
  13the Fed has not stated an explicit inflation target, the ECB’s price stability objective is defined 
as close to but below 2 percent.   
  CPI inflation in the first quarter of 2009 was 0.9 percent in the euro area and -0.2 
percent in the United States.  While the ECB defines its price stability objective in terms of 
the overall CPI, the FOMC tends to focus on the PCE deflator which registered at 0.4 percent 
in the first quarter. With regard to the output gap, neither the ECB nor the Fed publishes its 
estimate in real time.  Comparable estimates of this gap are available from the International 
Monetary Fund (2009).  In April the IMF published output gap estimates of -4.1 percent in the 
United States and -4.3 percent in the euro area for the year of 2009.  Using these estimates 
one can obtain interest rate prescriptions from Taylor’s rule of 0.2 percent for the euro area 
and -1.3 percent for the United States (or -0.4 percent with the PCE deflator). 
  Against the background of such Taylor rule prescriptions it is not surprising that the 
Fed moved towards quantitative easing earlier than the ECB.  Even so, the ECB’s policy rate 
of 1 percent remained rather high in light of the Taylor rule prescription and the case for pre-
emptive policy easing discussed in the preceding section.  Technically, the ECB has let the 
market rate move in the band between its repo rate of one percent and the deposit rate of ¼ 
percent.  This was accomplished by full allotment to banks demanding funds at the repo rate 
and by abstaining from fine-tuning, liquidity absorbing measures.   Arguably, this approach 
induced some degree of uncertainty about the ECB’s operating target in the money market 
compared to the past.  Rather than using the remaining room for lowering the overnight policy 
rate, the ECB chose to offer 1-year repos at the same rate of one percent with full allotment 
starting in June.  This measure added downward pressure to overnight money market rates 
within the corridor set by repo and deposit rates.  Additional easing could have been provided 
by lowering the deposit rate and thereby raising the incentive for banks to lend to other banks 
in the interbank market.   The ECB’s direct asset purchases remained modest in magnitude. 
  14However, it was useful for market observers to learn that the ECB would have the instruments 
and willingness to engage in quantitative easing.   
The Federal Reserve pursued its approach of credit or quantitative easing rather 
forcefully.  In this regard, an important question for market observers concerns the 
appropriate magnitude of balance sheet expansion.  The Fed has initiated a significant number 
of new tools and asset purchase programs. However, it has refrained from explaining what 
effect it would expect from a particular amount of direct asset purchases and what effect it 
would consider appropriate. In this manner, policy has shifted from rates to quantities but has 
abandoned the notion of a precisely quantified operating target.  An operating target could in 
principle be stated for the overall quantity of base money.  Consistent with the Fed’s reliance 
on the effects of the composition of asset purchases in particular markets such operating 
targets could also be stated with regard to the particular premia the Fed is hoping to influence.  
The arguments and evidence presented in this note suggest that quantitative easing can 
be a powerful tool for avoiding deflation.  A note of caution, however, is in order.   In 2002, 
then-Governor Bernanke noted:  “Japan’s economy faces some significant barriers to growth 
besides deflation, including massive financial problems in the banking and corporate sectors 
and a large overhang of government debt”. This warning is not without some relevance for 
the United States and other economies in the year 2009.  
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